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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Paul J. Cavanaugh appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The facts underlying Cavanaugh's convictions for vehicular manslaughter and 
leaving the scene of an injury accident are as follows: 
On March 10, 2005, Sara Jones was struck by the driver of a 
pickup truck while walking along a dirt road at approximately 6:30 in the 
evening. She later died from her injuries. Cavanaugh, who was the 
registered owner of the truck and who several minutes later emerged from 
the dark wooded area that the truck had swerved into after striking Jones, 
was charged with vehicular manslaughter and leaving the scene of an 
injury accident, Idaho Code sections 18-4006 and -8007, respectively. 
The district court entered a judgment of conviction on a jury verdict for 
both charges on December 16, 2005. 
State v. Cavanaugh, Docket No. 33657, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 349, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App. February 10, 2009). Cavanaugh was sentenced to fifteen years with eight 
years fixed for vehicular manslaughter and a concurrent five-year fixed term for leaving 
the scene of an injury accident. State v. Cavanaugh, Docket No. 37705, 2011 
Unpublished Opinion No. 676, p.2 (Idaho App. October 26, 2011). 
Cavanaugh did not appeal his conviction, but on June 12, 2006, he filed a prose 
motion for a new trial under Idaho Criminal Rule 34, which was denied. kt On appeal, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Cavanaugh's motion for a new trial. 
Cavanaugh, DocketNo.33657. 
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On July 29, 2009, Cavanaugh filed a pro se post-conviction petition (R., Vol. 1, 
pp.4-102), presenting a variety of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including a 
claim that his trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal upon his timely request (R., 
Vol. 1, pp.55-56). The state filed an answer (R., Vol. 2, pp.223-243) and a motion for 
summary dismissal (R., Vol. 2, pp.251-270), and Cavanaugh filed a response to the 
state's motion (R., Vol. 2, pp.271-291). After a hearing (R., Vol. 2, p.323), the district 
court ruled that Cavanaugh's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a direct 
appeal and entered an order allowing Cavanaugh a renewed period of time to do so (R., 
Vol. 2, pp.325-328). 1 The district court granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal on all of Cavanaugh's remaining claims. (R., Vol. 2, pp.329-333.) Cavanaugh 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 2, pp.334-337.) 
1 In his subsequently filed direct appeal, Cavanaugh raised two issues, prosecutorial 
misconduct and excessive sentence. Cavanaugh, Docket No. 37705. In an 




Cavanaugh states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Cavanaugh's post-
conviction claim? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Cavanaugh failed to establish that the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his claim that his counsel acted ineffectively when he did not exercise his 
final peremptory challenge in jury selection at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cavanaugh Has Failed To Establish That He Presented A Prima Facie Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Cavanaugh argues that the district court erred in dismissing his post-conviction 
relief claim "that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed 
to exercise his final peremptory challenge to exclude juror R.H." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
He contends "the district court erred in finding, at the summary judgment stage, that 
failing to do so did not constitute deficient performance, and when it found that, 
assuming it was deficient, there was no prejudice shown." (Id.) 
Contrary to Cavanaugh's arguments, the district court correctly ruled he failed to 
present evidence establishing a prima facie showing that his trial counsel's decision to 
not exercise a peremptory challenge against juror R.H. constituted deficient 
performance and that such performance was prejudicial to the outcome of his trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court freely reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
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(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Cavanaugh Has Failed To Show He Presented Admissible Evidence Constituting 
A Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P .3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each 
element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 
802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906 (b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not 
required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at802 (citing Ferrierv. State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001)). 
"Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law." lit 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner 
must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner must demonstrate: 1) 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A reviewing court evaluates 
counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes 
that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal 
strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). 
Counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve 
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the 
UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles 
v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 
Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional 
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a 
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have 
been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance by trial counsel for failing to either 
challenge a potential juror for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge against a 
potential juror, a petitioner must show that counsel's decision was not a legitimate 
strategic or tactical choice. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 n.5, 245 P.3d 961, 
978 n.5 (2010) ("where defense counsel did not try to exclude a juror for cause, nor use 
a peremptory challenge to remove her, the trial court's failure to remove that juror for 
cause sua sponte could not constitute fundamental error as the record failed to 
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demonstrate that the juror would be biased against the defendant, such that the failure 
to attempt to exclude that juror could not have been a strategic decision by the 
defense") (citing State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 216 P.3d 146 (Ct. App. 2009)). 
Absent evidence of actual bias, counsel is not ineffective for failing to challenge a 
potential juror. Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 639, 646, 903 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Ct. App. 
1995). The "relevant test for determining whether a juror is biased is 'whether the juror' 
. .. had such fixed opinions that [he] could not judge impartially the guilt of the 
defendant." United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1349-1350 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)); see I.C. § 19-2019(2) (Actual bias 
defined as "the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the 
case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion on the part 
of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality."). 
Cavanaugh had the opportunity in post-conviction proceedings to demonstrate 
actual bias, but failed to do so. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1981) ("[T)he 
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the 
opportunity to prove actual bias."). The record of the underlying criminal case supports 
the district court's conclusion that Cavanaugh had failed to make a prima facie showing 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for not excusing the juror through a peremptory 
challenge. 
The jury selection hearing record reflects that the juror, R.H., had no actual bias 
against Cavanaugh. The record supports the district court's determination that "[t]he 
petition and other documents submitted by Mr. Cavanaugh, together with his argument 
at the hearing, failed to show that his trial counsel were ineffective" for failing to exercise 
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a peremptory challenge against juror R.H. (R., Vol. 2, p.332.) Shortly before juror R.H. 
was called to join the group of the "first 27" jurors, the district judge asked that group 
whether anyone had "any bias or prejudice either for or against Mr. Cavanaugh at this 
time?" and no one raised their hand. (Tr.,2 p.54, L.25 - p.55, L.2.) The judge also 
asked the first 27 jurors whether they would be willing to follow the court's instructions 
on the law even if they believed the law should be different, and received only one 
negative response. (Tr., p.56, L.20 - p.58, L.1.) Just before juror R.H. was selected to 
join the first 27 jurors, the judge asked, "[a]re there are any of you if selected as a juror 
in this case who is [sic] unwilling or unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based 
upon the evidence presented in this courtroom and the law as instructed to you by the 
court?" and no one responded. (Tr., p.58, Ls.2-11.) After juror R.H. was chosen to join 
the first 27 jurors, he was asked if he would have answered "yes" to any of the 
questions previously asked, and answered "yes." (Tr., p.60, Ls.9-12.) The following 
dialogue ensued: 
THE COURT: And do you know something about this case or have you 
read something about this case? 
A. I did. Where I work is just a short distance on this particular road from 
the event. Yes. My daughter worked with Sara. I know one of the 
individuals they intend on calling as a witness. Do I think that I could 
judge fairly? Yes. But I don't know. I - what I've heard here by the 
prosecuting attorney and the defense attorney already today has changed 
my vision of what I believed happened so ... 
THE COURT: Knowing - or having heard about this case, do you feel that 
you could set aside what you've heard about this case and decide the 
2 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. All "Tr." references in 
this brief are to the transcript prepared in relation to State v. Cavanaugh, Docket No. 
33657. 
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case based solely upon the evidence that's presented during the course of 
this trial? 
A I believe that I could. 
THE COURT: And with regard to the individuals that you know of who 
may be a witness in this case or witnesses, do you feel that you would 
give that person or persons greater weight than you would someone else? 
Or lesser weight? Either one. 
A I - it would - I would say greater weight. Yes. Probably. 
THE COURT: Would this knowledge prevent you from acting with 
impartiality in this case? 
A I don't believe so. Like I said, I - what I - the knowledge that I had 
until today has already been changed by what I have seen here. 
THE COURT: Any other questions that you would have responded yes 
to? 
A No. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
A Well, only that one question that I do - I do know personally one of the 
individuals that you intend on calling and my daughter worked with Sara at 
Stoneridge Resort. I did not know Sara. I work with people who did know 
her. All right. And this happened close to where I workP 
(Tr., p.60, L.8 - p.61, L.25.) 
Despite knowing one of the witnesses and recognizing that he might give that 
witness's testimony greater weight, juror R.H. nonetheless stated he did not believe his 
knowledge of that witness would prevent him from acting impartially as a juror. (Id.) 
"Although not always dispositive, the court is entitled to rely on assurances from venire 
3 It should be noted that juror R.H. did not say that the witness he knew was a 
prosecution witness. When defense counsel subsequently asked if any jurors "know 
anyone in law enforcement, work with law enforcement or [are] associated with law 
enforcement in any way" (Tr., p.88, Ls.11-13), R.H. did not respond (Tr., p.88, L.13 -
p.92, L.17). 
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persons concerning partiality or bias." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 
1170, 1180 (1999). Having heard, first-hand, R.H.'s assurance that he could be an 
impartial juror, both the court and Cavanaugh's trial counsel had a valid basis to 
conclude likewise. It has often been stated: 
The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely ignorant 
of the facts and issues involved in the case. To hold that the mere 
existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a 
prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible 
standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion 
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 
Hairston, 133 Idaho at 506, 988 P.2d at 1180 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 
800 (1975)); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 891, 591 P.2d 130, 138 (1979). Similarly, 
juror R.H. represented to the trial court, in essence, that he could lay aside any 
inclination he might have had to give more weight to the testimony of the witness he 
knew in order to serve as an impartial juror. In addition, the juror previously indicated 
(by stating there were no other questions he would have responded "yes" to) he was not 
biased against Cavanaugh, he would follow the trial court's instructions on the law, and 
he would render an impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented at trial. (Tr., 
p.54, L.25 - p.55, L.2; p.56, L.20 - p.58, L.11; p.61, Ls.16-18.) 
Although Cavanaugh asserts he "presented unrebutted evidence that his 
attorney failed to strike a juror who admitted that he would be biased in favor of one of 
the witnesses" and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10), he failed to present a genuine issue of material fact warranting such a hearing. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 
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297. After reciting the voir dire dialogue between juror R.H. and the trial judge,4 
Cavanaugh merely asserted in his verified petition: 
Mr. [R.H.] is obviously prejudice, he knows one of the witnesses, would 
give more weight to his testimony, his mind has been changed by what he 
has seen in the courtroom. Being that the verdict was guilty, Mr. [R.H.] 
made up his mind to the guilt of the Petitioner before the trial. Being a 
long time member of the community would give reason for Mr. [R.H.] to be 
prejudice against the Petitioner whom has not. Mr. [R.H.] stated he has 
already been changed by what he has seen here - in the court. What did 
he see, a courtroom full of friends, neighbors, and workmates. It is easy 
for him to be prejudice. 
(R., Vol. 1, p.37 (verbatim except where indicated by brackets).) Cavanaugh's 
statement that juror R.H. had "made up his mind" about Cavanaugh's guilt is pure 
speculation, unsupported by any evidence. At the hearing on the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, Cavanaugh did not present any additional argument relative to his 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise a peremptory challenge 
to juror R.H. (See generally 4/21/10 Tr., pp.2-13.) 
It is Cavanaugh's burden to demonstrate that he presented a genuine issue of 
material fact about whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to peremptorily 
strike juror R.H. However, he failed to present a prima facie case showing the juror 
could not render a fair and impartial verdict. See Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
at 802; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. The district court correctly 
concluded that the "petition and other documents submitted by Mr. Cavanaugh, together 
with his argument at the hearing, failed to show that his trial counsel were ineffective 
before trial, during trial ... and that there is a reasonable probability that but for the 
4 Cavanaugh also filed with the district court the trial transcript pertaining to the voir dire 
of juror R.H. (R., Vol. 1, pp.119-120.) 
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conduct of his counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been different. (R., Vol. 2, 
p.332.) See United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in 
a trial for abusive sexual contact, the trial court did not err in failing to excuse jurors for 
cause based upon statements that they had been the victims of child molestation or that 
they had relatives that had been victims of child molestation because the juror's 
indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict). 
In sum, Cavanaugh's claim is nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation 
that, despite juror R.H.'s avowal that he could render a fair and impartial verdict, he was 
denied a fair trial. Such speculation is insufficient to carry Cavanaugh's burden. 
Without a showing of actual bias on the part of juror R.H., Cavanaugh has failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact that, under Strickland, his trial counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to exercise a peremptory challenge against the juror, 
and that absent such failure there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different. Accordingly, Cavanaugh has failed to establish 
any error in the district court's summary dismissal of his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Cavanaugh's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2012 
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